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SECURITY INFORMATION

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

10 December 1951

SUBJECT: DRAFT #2: SE-20: THE CONSEQUENCES OF CERTAIN US
COURSES OF ACTION WITH RESPECT TO
COMMUNIST CHINA AND KOREA
(For Board Consideration)

THE PROBLEM

To estimate (a) the effect on Communist China of certain
US courses of action, and (b) the Communist reaction to these
*
courses of action.

ESTIMATE

1. Interdiction of Sea-borne imports to Communist China.

a. An effective interdiction of Communist Chinese sea-
borne imports would require not only an embargo on exports and
shipping to Communist China, but also the imposition of full
scale naval blockade of all Chinese Communist ports, including
Port Arthur and Dairen. It would also be necessary to prevent
shipments to Communist China from Hong Kong and Macao. (See

*
The question of whether the UN would support the US in
these courses of action is beyond the scope of this paper.

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Tab A for Chinese Communist data on trade during 1951.)

b. Such interdiction would create serious economic strains in Communist China, but would not critically weaken Chinese Communist military power or internal controls, at least for a considerable period of time.

c. The Chinese Communists would be unable to counter such a blockade effectively but would probably employ mine warfare against the blockading ships and might employ aircraft and submarines.

d. The USSR would probably do its utmost to offset the economic effects of the embargo and blockade on Communist China. It would probably refuse to recognize the legality of the blockade, would probably undertake to escort Soviet shipping into Port Arthur and Dairen (if these ports were blockaded), and might escort Soviet shipping into other blockaded ports. Interception of such Soviet shipping might well create serious incidents, but we believe it unlikely that the USSR would make such incidents, in themselves, casus belli.

2. Intensification of UN military operations in the Korean area.

a. Large scale UN ground operations in Korea, combined with unrestricted UN air attack on Communist military targets

CONFIDENTIAL

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in North Korea and Manchuria, would, if successful, seriously impair the Communist military capability for further military operations in Korea.

b. Such a course of action might compel the Communists to conclude an early armistice. We believe it more likely, however, that the Chinese Communists would initially attempt to use their air forces offensively against UN forces and targets, possibly including Japan and Okinawa and that they would appeal to the USSR for greatly increased assistance in the attempt to counter the UN effort.

c. The USSR would probably react immediately by giving all possible support, short of the commitment of their own ground forces, but including the commitment of their own air force to the air defense of Manchuria and North Korea.

d. If these measures should prove insufficient to permit the Communists to maintain themselves militarily in Korea, the Communists might (1) withdraw from Korea and continue by guerrilla attacks to harass the UN occupation; (2) conclude an armistice while still in control of some portion of North Korea, and (3) commit Soviet forces to the extent necessary to hold a line in North Korea. On balance, we believe the chances are somewhat better than even that the Communists would conclude an armistice.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

3. Bombardment of Strategic Targets throughout Communist China

a. A bombardment of strategic targets in Communist China (including urban complexes, industrial facilities, transportation systems, naval bases and shipyards, airfields, and troop concentrations) would, if successful, seriously reduce Chinese Communist military power, disrupt the Chinese Communist economy, and jeopardize Communist control over at least some parts of the country. (See Tab B on Strategic Targets in Communist China.)

b. The Chinese Communists would have little capability to counter such bombardment except in Manchuria and North China, (See Tab C on Chinese Communist Air Defensive Capabilities) but they would undoubtedly call upon the USSR for additional assistance of all types, especially for purposes of air defense.

c. The USSR would commit Soviet units for air defense without delay.

d. If the Communists found that they could not successfully resist this bombardment and if they estimated that the consequences listed above were likely to ensue, they would probably feel impelled to conclude an armistice. We

CONFIDENTIAL

do not believe it likely that the USSR would commit its own forces to an extent constituting de facto war between the USSR and the US in the Far East unless it believed Communist control of North China and Manchuria to be seriously threatened, and unless it were prepared at the same time to accept a grave risk of general war between the USSR and the US.

4. Employment of Nationalist Military Forces

a. Nationalist forces on Taiwan could not be effectively used for offensive action against the Chinese Communist mainland unless the present US program for equipping and training these forces were greatly expanded, and unless the US were willing to provide substantial air and naval as well as logistic support for an invasion. In any event, Nationalist forces could not be ready for an invasion operation before 1953. (See Tab D for detailed statement of Nationalist capabilities.)

b. Even after the Nationalists became operationally effective, a Nationalist invasion of the mainland operationally supported by the US could be contained by the Chinese Communists. Such an invasion would probably be construed by Peiping as an indication of a US determination to destroy the Chinese Communist regime.

c. The USSR would probably regard a Nationalist-US operation against the Chinese mainland in the same light and would

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probably give the Chinese Communists whatever air support and other assistance short of the commitment of Soviet forces required by the Chinese Communists to contain or reduce the invasion.

5. Utilization of Non-Communist Guerrilla Forces Already in China.

a. The Chinese Communists have succeeded in greatly reducing the strength of guerrilla forces throughout China and these forces do not now have a significant operational capability. (See Tab E for detailed statement of guerrilla capabilities.) Even if guerrilla capabilities could be developed, the guerrillas could be employed effectively only in conjunction with other courses of action directed against Communist China.

6. Expansion of the Korean War by a Combination of Several or All Courses of Action Considered Above.

a. If the Korean war should continue, the Chinese Communist regime would probably be confronted with increasing domestic problems such as inflation and popular disaffection, and possibly dissidence among Chinese Communist leaders. It is unlikely, however, that a continuation of the war in Korea on substantially the present scale would so harm the Communists as

- 6 -

~~TOP SECRET~~

CONFIDENTIAL

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to oblige them to conclude the war on terms which they might regard as seriously disadvantageous.

b. An intensification of UN operations in Korea and an expansion of the war to include successful strategic air attacks against Manchuria and China proper and a successful interdiction of Communist China's seaborne imports would have the following effects on Communist capabilities: (a) Communist China's ability to continue the war in Korea would be severely strained; (b) lines of communication throughout Communist China would be disrupted; (c) Communist China would be forced into complete dependence on the USSR for military supplies and critical imports; (d) Chinese Communist capabilities for large-scale military operations in Southeast Asia would be virtually eliminated; (e) Communist China's ability to maintain effective control of the mainland would be progressively reduced.

c. Communist reaction to any combination of these courses of action would be determined by the degree of threat presented. (In any event, the USSR would probably provide the maximum assistance possible, short of commitment of its forces offensively, against UN forces and installations.) So long as the Chinese Communists, with such support, were able to continue military operations in Korea and maintain effective control of the mainland,

- 7 -
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

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the Communists would probably accept the continuation of a prolonged and expanded war. If, however, the Communists should find that these measures were insufficient to insure continued Communist military operations in North Korea and continued Communist control of North China and Manchuria, the Communists would probably then seek a cessation of the fighting in the Far East. If the cessation of hostilities could only be obtained on terms which the Communists considered seriously disadvantageous, the USSR would probably then take whatever steps were necessary to insure continued Communist military operations in North Korea and continued Communist control of North China and Manchuria even to the extent of engaging in a de facto war with the US in the Far East and risking general war. The USSR would probably leave to the US the onus of expanding such a de facto war into a general war.

- 8 -

CONFIDENTIAL

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CONFIDENTIAL

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TAB A

ANALYSIS OF CHINESE COMMUNIST TRADE

FOR 1951

(in preparation)

- 9 -

CONFIDENTIAL

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CONFIDENTIAL

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TAB B

STRATEGIC BOMBING TARGETS IN COMMUNIST CHINA

1. The Chinese Communist Air Force would be the most important target in a strategic bombardment of Communist China. Successful attacks against the airfields on which this force is deployed could be expected to produce the following results: (a) the reduction of CCAF offensive capabilities and elimination of the immediate threat of a major CCAF counter-air offensive against US ground, naval, and air forces; (b) the destruction of air base facilities and installations; (c) high casualties among trained aviation personnel; (d) the reduction of CCAF air defensive capabilities, and (e) the placing of heavy logistical demands on the Soviets for replacement of aircraft and related equipment and possibly for trained personnel.

2. Chinese Communist naval bases and shipyards are high priority targets because their neutralization would eliminate their use by the Soviets for supporting naval operations against UN forces.

3. Troop concentrations, some of which may contain 25,000 to 200,000 Chinese Communist troops, may normally be found in Communist China. These are vulnerable to atomic bombing attacks,

- 10 -

Approved For Release 2000/08/29 : CIA-RDP79S01011A000600010044-5

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

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particularly surprise attacks. Successful attacks on these troop concentrations would seriously weaken the Chinese Communist Field Forces.

4. Chinese Communist transportation, particularly its inadequate railroad transportation system, is particularly vulnerable to systematic air attacks. Successful attacks on the transportation system could divide China into several areas which could be separately subjected to air interdiction, thus preventing mutual military and economic support. The Manchurian rail network, upon which the Chinese Communists must depend for such critical imports from the USSR as petroleum, tanks, motor vehicles, heavy weapons, munitions, aircraft parts, and possibly aircraft is singularly vulnerable. If traffic on this rail network was interdicted on a continuing basis, the capability of the Communists for continuing the war in Korea would be seriously impaired.

5. Industrial facilities in Communist China would make profitable targets for a strategic bombing effort. Destruction of POL storage facilities and refineries would result in shortages of aviation fuels and fuels for surface transportation. Since the electric power industry serves virtually all the significant manufacturing plants in China, plays a major part in

TOP SECRET

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CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

powering equipment for the extraction of coal from China's mines, and performs other important military functions such as lighting transshipment centers along the transportation systems, its destruction would have a significant deleterious effect on Communist war-making potential. The Chinese Communist munitions, iron, and steel industries would make profitable targets because their destruction would increase the strain on the tenuous supply lines leading to the USSR from Communist China.

6. There are 16 urban complexes in Communist China which together have a population of over 17,000,000 and contain the major part of all modern Chinese Communist manufacturing installations. Their destruction would virtually eliminate Communist Chinese manufacturing plants and would halt, at least temporarily, rail transportation on all major rail routes. From a long range point of view the destruction of these 16 complexes would involve the loss of technical and managerial personnel who could not be easily or quickly replaced. Heavy losses probably would also be caused to governmental and military personnel.

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TAB C

CHINESE NATIONALIST ARMED FORCES

1. The Chinese Nationalist Army has a strength of 451,000 personnel organized into 38 infantry divisions, 4 armored groups, 1 paratroop group, 3 fort commands, 5 independent regiments, and 2 independent battalions. The bulk of these forces is disposed on Formosa; some combat elements are located on Matsu, Quemoy, and the Pescadores Islands. The Nationalist Army has no significant number of trained reserves, and under present circumstances its mobilization capacity is negligible. The mass induction of Formosan youths would not be feasible unless the US greatly expanded its proposed MDAP. Even in this event, the dependability and effectiveness of Formosan troops would be questionable. At the present time, the Nationalist Army is short of some types of ammunition, arms, and other equipment, and the materiel that is available is heterogeneous and poorly maintained. Because of these materiel deficiencies, the lack of reserve manpower, and the poor command structure (including the lack of interservice coordination), the combat effectiveness of the Nationalist Army is poor. After receipt of the proposed US materiel aid and after training in its use, its effectiveness will be substantially improved.

2. The Chinese Nationalist Air Force consists of 8 combat groups possessing 384 tactical aircraft. Of this total, however, only 121 aircraft are serviceable for combat. These consist of 35 light bombers and

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86 piston fighters predominantly of World War II design. Because of the lack of spare parts and improper maintenance facilities, the combat effectiveness of this force is very poor. Under conditions of sustained combat, particularly if opposed by jet aircraft, its capabilities would be reduced to a negligible factor in a day or two. In spite of these difficulties, the Chinese Nationalist Air Force is believed to have the organizational structure and necessary personnel to absorb and utilize the additional equipment necessary to make it an effective force. However, the present US aid program is not expected to improve the Nationalist Air Force or even maintain its present capabilities.

3. The Chinese Nationalist Navy consists of approximately 150 miscellaneous craft, the largest of which are 7 destroyer-type vessels. Under optimum conditions and provided that there were no air or naval opposition, the Nationalists would be capable of transporting up to two divisions in assault by means of orthodox landing craft and following up with five or six water-lifted divisions. No amount of logistic support could immediately effect a great increase in the effectiveness of the Nationalist Navy. Training in large-scale operations, command reorganization, the removal of political intrigues, and other slowly achieved changes are prerequisites to any major improvement.

4. It is evident that the capabilities of the Chinese Nationalist Armed Forces are extremely limited. It is estimated that the Chinese Nationalists are at present incapable, by themselves, of defending

- 11 -

~~TOP SECRET~~

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CONFIDENTIAL

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Taiwan against an all-out assault by the Chinese Communist Forces. On the offensive side, the Chinese Nationalists could not at present establish a lodgment on the mainland without the full participation of US forces, including US ground forces. After receipt of proposed US materiel aid and after training in its use, the Nationalist Army could provide 10 infantry divisions for an assault on the mainland if the US continued logistic support to the invasion force. However, since the presently proposed aid will not improve Nationalist air and naval capabilities, an attempted assault on the mainland still would have no hope of success unless the US provided powerful air and sea operational support.

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CONFIDENTIAL

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TAB D

ESTIMATE OF THE PRESENT STRENGTH AND
CAPABILITIES OF ANTI-COMMUNIST GUER-
RILLAS IN CHINA

A. THEIR STRENGTH AND LOCATION

1. The maximum total number of effective guerrillas throughout all China which can with any certainty be said to exist at the present time is approximately 175,000. Dormant or potential guerrillas exist in unknown numbers, but the utility of this category is and probably will remain small pending all-out war or revolution in China.

2. Active guerrilla forces are located for the most part in inaccessible areas -- mountainous regions and on Nationalist-held offshore islands. Principal regions of activity continue to be the Pearl River and Canton area, the Kwangtung-Fukien border, the Kwangsi-Kweichow border, Szechwan, the Chekiang coast, southwestern Yunnan, and scattered areas in the Mongol and Moslem northwest.

B. THEIR PHYSICAL COMPOSITION AND CONDITION

3. The term "guerrillas" is an elastic one since these resistance forces are heterogeneous in nature and vary greatly in composition from one unit to another. Generally speaking, guerrillas fall into the following categories: (a) ex-Nationalist forces, some of whom profess allegiance, but most of whom owe no allegiance, to Taiwan; (b) discontented

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landlords and peasants; (c) bandits; (d) members of traditional secret societies, and (e) minority racial and religious groups. The most active and effective units are those in categories (a) and (e).

4. Guerrilla forces suffer from a total lack of central direction and coordination, from a relative lack of organization, quite often from lack of knowledge of proper guerrilla warfare tactics, from serious deficiencies in arms and ammunition, and, perhaps most importantly, from an almost total lack of communication facilities. In addition, guerrilla forces subsist on submarginal food, clothing, and medical levels.

C. THEIR MOTIVATION AND ALLEGIANCE

5. Economic considerations generally outweigh political, and the basic motivating force behind guerrilla activity at the present time is the struggle for existence and self-preservation.

6. Despite Nationalist and independent claims, the Chinese guerrillas are and will be allegiant for the most part to whatever leader and whatever political group can support and maintain them.

7. Such organization and centralized direction as does exist is primarily that now being exercised by Taiwan. The Chinese Nationalist guerrilla effort, however, remains largely ineffectual because of the hindrances of internal Chinese Nationalist politics.

8. Independent elements continue to claim a substantial guerrilla potential in Kwangsi and Kwangtung. It is believed that the claims of

~~TOP SECRET~~

CONFIDENTIAL

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Taiwan against an all-out assault by the Chinese Communist Forces. After the Nationalist Ground Forces become effective (possibly during 1953 under the present US aid program), the Nationalists might be able to establish a bridgehead on the China coast, provided that the US furnished substantial air and naval support in addition to logistic support for the Nationalist invasion forces. If the US program for the Chinese Nationalists were greatly expanded so as to improve Nationalists military leadership and provide the materiel and training needed for existing ground, naval, and air forces plus such additional manpower as could be recruited on Taiwan, the Nationalists might be able to establish a bridgehead on the China coast without further US participation. However, we do not believe that such a bridgehead could be consolidated and expanded, unless the US provided tactical air support in addition to continuing logistic support for the Nationalist forces. Even under these circumstances, it is doubtful if the Nationalists could recruit sufficient additional manpower on the mainland to enable them to break out of a lodgement and actually threaten Communist control over large areas of the mainland. In the light of estimated current Chinese Communist capabilities, the Nationalists could accomplish this result only in conjunction with a major US war effort, including at least a US strategic bombing campaign and probably the support of US ground forces.

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